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Abstract DTLS is a transport layer security protocol
designed to provide secure communication over unreli-
able datagram protocols. Before starting to communi-
cate, a DTLS client and server perform a specific hand-
shake in order to establish a secure session and agree on
a common security context. However, the DTLS hand-
shake is affected by two relevant issues. First, the DTLS
server is vulnerable to a specific Denial of Service (DoS)
attack aimed at forcing the establishment of several half
open sessions. This may exhaust memory and network
resources on the server, so making it less responsive
or even unavailable to legitimate clients. Second, al-
though it is one of the most efficient key provision-
ing approaches adopted in DTLS, the pre-shared key
provisioning mode does not scale well with the num-
ber of clients, it may result in scalability issues on the
server side, and it complicates key re-provisioning in
dynamic scenarios. This paper presents a single and
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efficient security architecture which addresses both is-
sues, by substantially limiting the impact of DoS, and
reducing the number of keys stored on the server side to
one unit only. Our approach does not break the exist-
ing standard and does not require any additional mes-
sage exchange between DTLS client and server. Our
experimental results show that our approach requires a
shorter amount of time to complete a handshake execu-
tion, and consistently reduces the time a DTLS server
is exposed to a DoS instance. We also show that it con-
siderably improves a DTLS server in terms of service
availability and robustness against DoS attack.
Keywords Security · DTLS · Denial of Service · Key
provisioning
1 Introduction
Secure communication has become particularly impor-
tant for a great number of applications, ranging from e-
commerce to plant monitoring, from certified e-mail to
home automation. Currently, the Transport Layer Se-
curity (TLS ) protocol [1] is the most widely deployed
solution for securing network communication on top
of reliable transport protocols, such as TCP [2]. How-
ever, since an increasing number of applications relies
on datagram protocols, the IETF has recently intro-
duced the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS )
protocol [3]. It is designed to be as similar to TLS as
possible, but explicitly deals with the unreliable nature
of datagram protocols, and thus can work also on top
of UDP [4].
Like TLS, also DTLS requires two peers, namely
client and server, to perform a handshake in order to
establish a secure session. Typically, the handshake is
started by the DTLS client, by sending a ClientHello
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message to the DTLS server. Then, the two peers are
able to authenticate one another, agree on a common
cryptographic suite, and establish the security material
to be used for secure communication. Specifically, a key
provisioning approach based on pre-shared keys (PSKs)
[5] can be adopted, in order to avoid managing a Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (PKI) and to avoid the compu-
tational complexity introduced by public key cryptog-
raphy operations. PSK has become very popular, and
is particularly suitable to application scenarios such
as building automation or smart metering, where the
servers could potentially be even resource-constrained
devices operating over low bandwidth networks.
In this paper, we argue that the DTLS handshake
is affected by two relevant issues.
First, the DTLS server is highly vulnerable to a spe-
cific Denial of Service (DoS ) attack. In particular, an
adversary can repeatedly send ClientHello messages to
the server, and force it to start performing a consider-
able number of handshakes. The only currently avail-
able solution against this attack relies on an optional
and stateless Cookie exchange between client and server
[3], performed in the initial phases of the handshake.
However, this countermeasure only complicates the at-
tack, and does not offer any fundamental protection
against it. In fact, by intercepting handshake messages
sent by the server, the adversary can induce the latter
to establish a consistent amount of half open DTLS ses-
sions. This can exhaust memory and network resources
on the server, making it less responsive or even unavail-
able to process requests from legitimate clients. As an
additional side effect, DoS attacks performed with valid
spoofed addresses result in the server sending unex-
pected handshake messages to “innocent” nodes, with
a consequent amplification effect against them. There-
fore, the solution based on Cookie exchange is not a
good countermeasure against a DoS performed by a well
determined and resourceful adversary.
Second, in case the PSK provisioning approach is
adopted, the DTLS server is supposed to store a set of
cryptographic symmetric keys, each one of which is pre-
shared with some associated clients. This approach is
destined mostly to closed environments, where it is eas-
ily possible to provision shared keys to the involved par-
ties. In a more dynamic environment, this means that
a server would have to store and manage a considerable
number of pre-shared keys, or, in a worst case scenario,
even one for every possible client. Obviously, this does
not scale well with the number of DTLS clients, and it
considerably complicates key provisioning in dynamic
application scenarios. However, the PSK scheme is very
useful in a number of dynamic scenarios involving ei-
ther constrained devices or users that do not have the
capability to securely manage a PKI.
In this paper, we present a single and efficient se-
curity architecture which addresses both the two issues
mentioned above, by smoothly and harmoniously com-
bining the two following contributions. First, we define
a possible alternative PSK scheme, namely Derived Key
Mode, that prevents scalability and management issues
on the server side, by drastically reducing the number of
stored pre-shared keys to one only. This approach shifts
the load of key management to a trusted third party and
requires the client to do an extra round trip, thereby
greatly reducing the load on the server. In addition, it
makes the PSK scheme usable also in non closed, dy-
namic, environments, as a more lightweight alternative
to approaches based on certificates and PKI.
Secondly, we describe our preventive solution to the
DoS attack against the DTLS handshake. Our approach
allows the server to identify invalid ClientHello mes-
sages, and promptly abort the handshake execution at
the first step. So doing, the DoS attack is practically
neutralized, by substantially limiting its impact against
the server. Besides, any possible amplification effect
against other nodes is prevented altogether, and the
Cookie exchange is not required anymore, so avoiding
one message round trip between client and server. The
proposed security architecture relies on a Trust Anchor
entity, which is assumed to be in a trusted relation with
the DTLS server.
Furthermore, our approach displays the following
benefits. First, it does not require changes to the DTLS
standard and relies on a standardized extension method
for ClientHello handshake messages. Second, it does
not require any additional message exchange between
DTLS client and server, so resulting in a communica-
tion overhead for the server which is lower than that
when the Cookie exchange is adopted. Third, it does
not significantly contribute to the computing overhead
of DTLS client and server, i.e. the handshake process
maintains the same order of computational complexity.
Finally, in this paper we focus on the DTLS protocol,
given its notably high vulnerability to DoS. Neverthe-
less, our proposal is deployable also in the TLS proto-
col without changing the actual standard, although the
TLS handshake is much less exposed to DoS thanks to
the preliminary TCP connection establishment.
In order to prove the validity of our approach, we
did a proof of concept implementation, by extending
the library Scandium [6], which implements DTLS 1.2
[3] in a stand-alone way. Then, we relied on our im-
plementation to experimentally evaluate performance
on the client and server side, considering the library
Californium [7] and the Constrained Application Pro-
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tocol (CoAP) [8] developed by the IETF working group
CoRE [9]. We compare performance and effectiveness
of our approach with those of the original DTLS hand-
shake based on the Cookie exchange, considering also
an actual DoS attack launched against a DTLS server.
Results show that, in the presence of a DoS attack,
our approach considerably improves a DTLS server in
terms of robustness and service availability. Also, it con-
sistently reduces the time a DTLS server is exposed to
an attack instance, and requires a shorter amount of
time to complete a handshake execution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review some related work on DoS attacks.
Section 3 overviews the DTLS protocol, with particu-
lar reference to the handshake steps, while in Section 4
we highlight the handshake issues we address in the pa-
per. Section 5 defines the application scenario we refer
to, while we describe the provisioning of key material in
Section 6, and discuss our Derived Key Mode scheme in
Section 6.1. Then, Sections 7 and 8 detail our solution
to DoS attack. In Section 9, we present our proof of con-
cept implementation, discuss experimental results, and
compare our approach with the original DTLS hand-
shake based on the Cookie exchange. Finally, in Section
10 we draw our conclusive remarks.
2 Related Work
Denial of Service (DoS ) is a well known attack aimed
at making a host unavailable to its intended users, with
the explicit intent to prevent them from accessing a
service. It consists in exhausting some resource of the
victim (e.g. network bandwidth), so preventing it from
receiving legitimate service requests. With the help of
more compromised hosts over the network or the In-
ternet, such an attack can be mounted also in a coor-
dinated and widely distributed fashion, i.e. Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS ) [10], so resulting to be even
more effective.
A considerable number of solutions to thwart DoS
attacks have been proposed so far. As discussed in [11],
they can be mainly classified into two categories, i.e.
router-based and host-based. In particular, router-based
solutions rely on defense mechanisms installed in IP
routers in order to trace attack sources [12][13][14][15],
or detect and block attack traffic [16][17][18][19][20][21].
The main drawback of router-based solutions is that
they require not only router support, but also coordi-
nation among different routers and networks [11]. Be-
sides, they typically rely on various IP traceback tech-
niques based on Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM )
[13][22][23], which require to be universally deployed
among all routers.
Conversely, host-based solutions locally work at vic-
tim hosts and are immediately deployable. The counter-
measure against DoS proposed in this paper falls into
this category. Most of current host-based approaches
rely on resource management schemes [24][25], or aim at
reducing resource consumption on the victim through
different techniques, e.g. Client Puzzles [26][27], SYN
Cookies [28] and DDoS-resilient scheduler [29].
TCP SYN flooding is one of the most common DoS
attacks observed in the Internet [30]. Such an attack
is not actually based on sending huge volumes of traf-
fic to the designated victim, but is instead based on
exploiting a weakness in the TCP connection establish-
ment. In particular, spoofed TCP SYN packets are sent
to the victim host, so triggering the execution of the
TCP three-way handshake [2]. This induces the vic-
tim to transmit a TCP SYN-ACK packet and uselessly
wait for the reception of the associated ACK packet. In
such a way, the adversary can initiate, and leave unre-
solved, a large number of half open TCP connections on
the victim, so exhausting its memory and network re-
sources, and making it unable to serve other legitimate
requests. This kind of attack is very similar to the DoS
attack against the establishment of DTLS sessions that
we address in this paper.
Different techniques to detect TCP SYN flooding
attacks have been proposed. Most of them are based on
identifying anomalies in TCP traffic, considering the ar-
rival rate of bidirectional packets [31], asymmetries of
traffic for both directions [32], or difference between the
rates of TCP SYN packets and TCP FIN/RST packets
[33]. However, as highlighted in [34], such approaches
usually do not consider possible traffic variations, and
manage to detect ongoing attacks only once the victim
has been already seriously damaged. Then, [34] presents
a mechanism for detecting SYN flooding traffic more ac-
curately, by considering the arrival rate of SYN packets
together with the time variation of arrival traffic.
Counteraction of TCP SYN flooding attacks has
been investigated as well. In [35], Darmohray et al. dis-
cuss a router-based approach where routers mitigate
the attack effects by sending SYN-ACK packets on be-
half of the TCP server, and delivering SYN packets
to the server only upon receiving the associated ACK
packet from the TCP client. However, routers are re-
quired to handle the states of TCP connections on be-
half of TCP servers, and thus become the actual vic-
tims of possible long term attacks. Conversely, host-
based defenses typically rely on SYN Cache [36] and
SYN Cookies [28][37]. The SYN Cache mechanism al-
lows the victim to manage more half open TCP con-
nections, by storing them in a global hash table rather
than in a different backlog queue for each application.
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Nevertheless, SYN Cache does not protect from SYN
flooding attacks fundamentally. Instead, the approach
based on SYN Cookies consists in encrypting the SYN
packet header, and embedding the encryption output
in the sequence number field of the SYN-ACK packet.
Then, the TCP server allocates resources only upon re-
ceiving a valid ACK packet. However, as remarked in
[34], the encryption process may become another weak-
ness against the high-rated SYN packets. Also, the TCP
server does not maintain any state of the TCP connec-
tion until the reception of a valid ACK packet, hence
SYN-ACK packets cannot be retransmitted in case they
are lost. Finally, SYN Cookies do not allow for encoding
all TCP service parameters into SYN-ACK and ACK
packets, so preventing clients from using TCP perfor-
mance enhancements [27].
Client puzzles are another countermeasure against
TCP SYN flooding [26][38]. Practically, they force TCP
clients to solve a cryptographic riddle for each connec-
tion request, before the TCP server commits its re-
sources. However, puzzles may result in a not negligible
additional load on the client side, and it may be not easy
to minimize such an impact by tuning their difficulty
[27]. That is, there is the risk of introducing additional
and annoying service delays for legitimate users.
In [39], Dean and Stubblefield consider a similar
problem as we do, i.e. DoS attacks against the TLS
handshake, aiming at exhausting server resources by
inducing it to start and maintain half open TLS ses-
sions. Their solution relies on client puzzles in order to
make the attack more costly to be performed. In partic-
ular, the TLS server determines if it is overloaded with
TLS connection requests by considering the amount of
costly asymmetric cryptography operations performed
lately. In such a case, the server asks clients to addi-
tionally solve puzzles during the handshake execution.
However, [39] does not suggest other possible criteria to
trigger the usage of puzzles, in case the TLS handshake
does not rely on public key cryptography to establish
security material between client and server. Also, it
assumes the presence of an unconstrained server and
unconstrained honest clients able to solve such puz-
zles. Hence, this can not be transferred to scenarios
where potentially both client and server are resource
constrained, whereas the adversary is not.
With particular reference to the DTLS handshake,
the only currently available countermeasure against De-
nial of Service is based on a Cookie exchange performed
during the first handshake phases [3]. This is reasonable
and not surprising, since the current version of DTLS
has become a standard protocol only in 2012 [3]. How-
ever, as we discuss in Section 4.1, the Cookie exchange
does not protect from DoS attacks fundamentally, but
only complicates their performance.
The solution we propose in this paper is an alterna-
tive to the Cookie exchange described in [3], and does
not require any additional message exchange between
DTLS client and server. Furthermore, it allows the vic-
tim server to quickly detect an ongoing DoS, in order to
immediately abort invalid DTLS handshakes. Finally, it
requires only the performance of lightweight computa-
tions on the client and server side. The experimental
results we present in Section 9 show that our approach
successfully counteracts a DoS attack launched against
a DTLS server, so preserving service availability and
proving to be more convenient and effective than the
original approach based on Cookie exchange.
3 The DTLS protocol
This section briefly introduces the main aspects of the
DTLS protocol considered in this paper. First, we pro-
vide an overview of the security services provided by
DTLS. Then, we describe the DTLS handshake process,
with particular focus on the message exchange between
DTLS client and server. Finally, we discuss different
available approaches to perform initial provisioning of
security material to DTLS peers.
3.1 Overview
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS ) pro-
tocol [3] has been designed by the IETF in order to
provide secure communication for datagram protocols,
such as UDP [4]. DTLS is based on the TLS proto-
col [1], and provides equivalent security guarantees, i.e.
it allows client and server applications to communicate
with one another preventing eavesdropping, tampering,
and message forgery.
However, DTLS introduces some minimal changes
with respect to TLS, in order to deal with the unre-
liable nature of datagram transport protocols. First,
stream ciphers, such as RC4 [40], cannot be adopted,
and an explicit sequence number is included in every
DTLS message. This makes distinct messages indepen-
dent from one another, so allowing for correctly pro-
cessing them despite the unreliable transport service
and possible out-of-sequence delivery. Also, packet loss
is explicitly addressed by means of local timeouts and
message retransmission policies. Finally, upon receiving
invalid messages, they can be silently discarded, and the
associated DTLS connection may not be terminated.
Communication among two DTLS peers relies on se-
cure sessions, identified by a unique session ID chosen
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Fig. 1 DTLS record format
by the DTLS server. Besides, messages are transmitted
as a series of records, whose structure is shown in Fig-
ure 1. The Type field indicates the higher level protocol
used to process the enclosed data, while the Version
field states the employed version of the protocol. The
Length field represents the size of the actual application
data conveyed in the record, as a separate Fragment
field. Finally, with respect to TLS, two additional fields
are present, namely Epoch and Sequence Number. The
former is incremented upon a possible change in the cur-
rently used security protocols and material. Instead, the
latter is incremented for every new message transmit-
ted by the same peer over the same DTLS connection.
The concatenation of the Epoch and Sequence Number
fields is considered as a single 64 bit fresh value, which
is used to compute a Message Authentication Code for
assuring integrity of protected DTLS records.
3.2 Handshake
A DTLS client and server establish a new secure ses-
sion by performing a specific handhshake process. In
addition, they can resume old previously established
DTLS sessions, through a reduced handshake involv-
ing a shorter number of messages. The client is typi-
cally responsible for starting a session establishment,
by sending a ClientHello message to the server.
Figure 2 depicts the message exchange occurring
during a full DTLS handshake. In case multiple hand-
shake messages are transmitted at the same step, they
are grouped together in a single Flight. Messages whose
name is reported among square brackets are optional or
situation-dependent, and are not always sent. We refer
the reader to [1][3] for further details about the DTLS
handshake and the content of specific Flights.
As stressed in [3], the DTLS handshake is vulnera-
ble to Denial of Service (DoS ) attacks. That is, an ad-
versary can repeatedly transmit ClientHello messages
to a DTLS server, so triggering the establishment of
new DTLS sessions. From the server perspective, this
means allocating memory and network resources for
new sessions’ state, and performing useless processing
operations. In order to address such an attack, DTLS
introduces the optional exchange of a stateless Cookie
value. That is, upon receiving the first ClientHello mes-
sage, the DTLS server may reply with a HelloVerifyRe-
quest message, including a locally generated Cookie.
Fig. 2 Full DTLS handshake message exchange
Upon its reception, the client must reply with a sec-
ond ClientHello message, including the same Cookie re-
ceived from the server. Then, the server proceeds with
the rest of the handshake only if it successfully verifies
the Cookie received in the second ClientHello message.
This forces the adversary to receive the Cookie sent by
the server, hence complicating attacks performed with
spoofed IP addresses.
3.3 Key pre-provisioning
The DTLS handshake assumes that involved peers have
been previously provided with some security material.
This basically consists in a set of preinstalled keys used
during the DTLS handshake to agree on a premaster
secret. Such a premaster secret is used together with
random values generated by the client and server to
compute a master secret, from which the final security
material is derived. In practice, DTLS admits two main
approaches to provide preinstalled keys.
The first approach relies on asymmetric key pairs.
In addition to the classical method based on X.509 cer-
tificates [41], there also exist profiles for raw public keys
[42], where key pairs come with no certificate, and may
be generated by manufacturers and installed on nodes
before deployment. In this case, a DTLS node relies on
out-of-band means to validate raw public keys received
from other peers, and typically retains a list of identities
of peers it can communicate with.
The second approach relies on symmetric pre-shared
keys [5]. In this case, a DTLS client shares a symmet-
ric key with each DTLS server it may want to com-
municate with. During the DTLS handshake, a client
indicates which particular symmetric key is going to
be used, specifying a PSK identity in the ClientKeyEx-
change message. In order to help the client to select
which identity must be used, the server can optionally
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provide a PSK identity hint in the ServerKeyExchange
message. Finally, both the client and server compute
the premaster secret from the symmetric key they have
agreed upon.
The latter approach is destined mostly to closed
environments, where it is easily possible to provision
shared keys to the involved parties, and has two main
benefits. First, it makes it possible to avoid sending and
receiving public certificates and performing costly pub-
lic key operations, which is particularly important in
the presence of resource constrained DTLS server. Sec-
ond, it simplifies key management operations, especially
in environments where connections are mostly config-
ured manually in advance, and providing certificates is
not considered a preferable or even feasible option. In
the rest of this paper, we refer to the key provisioning
based on pre-shared keys.
4 Weaknesses in the DTLS handshake
In this section, we discuss two issues of the DTLS hand-
shake that we believe deserve to be addressed. That is,
in Section 4.1, we describe a Denial of Service (DoS )
attack based on the transmission of ClientHello mes-
sages, which can successfully be performed despite the
Cookie exchange described in Section 3.2 is adopted.
Then, in Section 4.2, we discuss the lack of scalability
and resilience to dynamic scenarios of the PSK provi-
sioning approach described in Section 3.3.
4.1 Denial of Service attack
As mentioned in Section 3.2, DTLS provides some pro-
tection against DoS attacks during the handshake ex-
ecution, by introducing the exchange of a Cookie be-
tween client and server. However, such a mechanism is
totally ineffective in case the attack is mounted with
valid IP addresses [3], and only complicates the attack
in case it is mounted with spoofed addresses. Thus, in
the presence of a well determined and resourceful adver-
sary, the DTLS handshake is practically still exposed to
DoS attacks.
Hereafter, we consider an active adversary able to
perform IP spoofing and to intercept messages sent by
the DTLS server. While relying on address spoofing
is not strictly required to perform a single attack in-
stance, it makes it possible to: i) hide the location of
the host(s) used to carry out the attack, so hiding a
quick path to the adversary; and ii) perform the at-
tack even when defenses based on address checking are
adopted, e.g. lists of legitimate hosts or blacklists of un-
trusted hosts. On the other hand, the adversary must
be somehow connected to the local network compris-
ing the victim DTLS server, in order to intercept its
replies to spoofed messages. In principle, the adversary
must have access to the server’s local network, and lis-
ten to network communication in promiscuous mode.
This is particularly easy in case of physical proximity
to insecure wireless networks. More generally, the ad-
versary must have under her control at least one node
in the same local network as the victim server. Then,
the compromised entity can intercept messages sent by
the server, and tunnel them to the adversary’s host(s)
actually responsible to perform the DoS attack.
As a possible alternative, the adversary may take
advantage of the Internet Protocol’s source routing op-
tion. This makes it possible to dictate the route that a
reply message travels, e.g. through a network that the
adversary can (more) easily control and where messages
sent by the DTLS server can be conveniently sniffed.
Although the source routing option can be disabled for
security reasons, it is on the other hand a convenient
choice for implementing mobility in IP networks.
Fig. 3 Denial of Service against DTLS server
In this paper, we consider a specific DoS attack
aimed at inducing the server to continuously start new
DTLS handshakes, in order to initiate and leave unre-
solved a large number of half-open DTLS sessions. More
specifically, the adversary repeatedly sends ClientHello
messages (Flight 1) to the victim DTLS server, so in-
ducing it to start performing a handshake. Hereafter, we
refer to such messages sent by the adversary as invalid
ClientHello messages. Then, by intercepting Flight 2
and transmitting a Flight 3 including the expected cor-
rect Cookie, the adversary can induce the server to per-
form the DTLS handshake until Flight 4 has been trans-
mitted, as shown in Figure 3. This means that, even
upon preparing and sending Flight 4, the server is not
able to assert whether the current handshake is genuine
or not, i.e. whether a DoS attack is ongoing. Besides,
the adversary can send multiple ClientHello messages
at the same time, each one of which from a different
spoofed address. This would force the server to han-
dle multiple instances of invalid DTLS handshakes, so
increasing the amount of performed processing opera-
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tions, and possibly causing the exhaustion of memory
and network resources. Hence, the server may become
less responsive, or even unavailable, upon the reception
of genuine ClientHello messages from legitimate clients.
Finally, due to its amplification effect, such an attack
can have a severe impact also on performance of “in-
nocent” network nodes, which receive unexpected in-
stances of Flight 2 and Flight 4 from the victim server.
Thus, we believe it is vital that the DTLS server
is able to distinguish between valid and invalid Clien-
tHello messages, so possibly aborting the DTLS hand-
shake as soon as possible. In Section 7, we propose our
preventive solution based on authenticated ClientHello
messages, which allows the server to detect a DoS at-
tack and halt invalid DTLS handshakes immediately
after the reception of Flight 1.
As a final remark, in case the DTLS handshake re-
lies on an asymmetric key pair, the adversary may also
intercept Flight 4 and send a fake Flight 5 to the server.
This would induce the server to process the fake Clien-
tKeyExchange message and perform costly public key
operations, so making the attack even more harmful. In
the rest of the paper, we focus on the attack depicted
in Figure 3, and consider the key provisioning based on
pre-shared keys [5].
4.2 Drawbacks of pre-shared key provisioning
If the PSK provisioning scheme described in Section
3.3 is adopted, a DTLS server is required to store and
manage a set of symmetric keys pre-shared with the
respective DTLS clients. This may result in scalability
issues on the server side, especially in a worst case sce-
nario when each client is associated to a different key, or
even represent a storage issue, in case the DTLS server
is a resource constrained device with limited memory
capabilities. Moreover, if the set of such clients dynam-
ically varies over time, e.g. in a pay-per-use scenario,
this would in turn require frequent re-provisioning of
lists of trusted clients, and possibly pre-shared keys,
to the individual servers. Hence, it is evident that the
original PSK provisioning approach does not scale well
with the number of clients, and may be a severe issue
in terms of memory occupancy and complexity of key
re-provisioning, especially in case of dynamic scenarios.
Other approaches have been proposed to address
pre-distribution of shared key material. For instance,
the authentication protocol Kerberos [43] relies on a
trusted third party to establish shared keys among two
parties having no previous security relation. Insofar,
Kerberos has the same goal as our Derived Key Mode
described in Section 6.1. However, Kerberos requires
to perform a whole protocol consisting of three round
trips, in order to authenticate both parties and estab-
lish a shared key. Also, Kerberos relies on tickets whose
size is typically in the order of magnitude of 1 KB.
Another key management scheme, namely Multi-
media Internet KEYing (MIKEY ), has been first de-
scribed in [44]. It is intended for real-time applications,
and originally provided three provisioning modes, based
on direct negotiation between peers, or pre-distribution
of credentials, such as certificates. More recently, an
additional ticket-based mode has been defined, namely
MIKEY-TICKET [45]. It provides distribution of key
material through a trusted Key Management Service
(KMS ), and is based on a ticket concept similar to that
in Kerberos. Also, MIKEY-TICKET is particularly rec-
ommended for systems when an initiator peer may not
know in advance the exact identity of the intended re-
sponder peer, or the set of possibly multiple responders
changes over time. This is why, unlike in Kerberos, tick-
ets are not bound to an exact identity until the actual
responder becomes fully determined. However, this re-
quires up to three different message round trips involv-
ing three different entitites. That is, the KMS is con-
tacted also by responders, in order to resolve MIKEY
tickets before providing the actual security material.
It is evident that the alternative pre-distribution
approaches mentioned above do not have efficiency as
their first goal, and are not primarily designed to work
with DTLS. Instead, as discussed in Section 6.1, our
Derived Key Mode scheme is integrated into the DTLS
handshake, hence not requiring any extra message round
trip, and uses a nonce value of roughly 40 bytes in size
in order to establish a shared key between DTLS client
and server. Also, as part of the security architecture
presented in this paper, our scheme is effectively and
harmoniously combined with the solution to DoS at-
tack against DTLS we present in Section 7.
5 Application scenario
In the rest of the paper, we consider an application sce-
nario where an adversary can easily perform the attack
described in Section 4.1, so forcing a server node to
uselessly start performing a DTLS handshake. Hence,
we believe that a node acting as DTLS server should
be able to promptly recognize invalid ClientHello mes-
sages, i.e. not sent by legitimate DTLS clients, and not
further proceed with the DTLS handshake execution.
Of course, at the same time, establishing a DTLS ses-
sion must be possible to any legitimate DTLS client.
A possible way to address this consists in relying on
a model where a DTLS client must obtain an authoriza-
tion before contacting a DTLS server to start the DTLS
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handshake and establish a secure connection. In the fol-
lowing, we assume that such an authorization process
is entrusted to a dedicated Trust Anchor (TA) entity.
In particular, we assume that the implemented policies
allow the TA to effectively determine whether to issue
an authorization to a requesting, legitimate, client. Fur-
thermore, the TA can generally provide additional ser-
vices. For instance, it can also act as an Authorization
Service managing permission release to access differ-
ent resources with different access rights [46][47], or as
a Key Distribution Center providing security material,
so avoiding the introduction of a dedicated key man-
agement infrastructure. With respect to an approach
based on proxy servers, this model has the advantage
to not require any particular adaptations to the actual
communication between clients and servers.
The TA can be practically implemented as an ac-
tual centralized entity, or according to a distributed
architecture. The centralized approach is easier to be
implemented and likely to be more efficient. At the
same time, a purely centralized TA can constitute a
single point of failure and be an easier target for a num-
ber of security attacks. Yet, it is reasonable to assume
that the TA is a special-purpose computer properly de-
signed, implemented and managed to be reliable and se-
cure. Although server reliability and security are still re-
search issues, the literature provides a number of estab-
lished techniques and methodologies, e.g. [48][49][50].
Note that it is reasonable to rely on such techniques to
protect relatively few deployed TAs. Instead, it is im-
practical to adopt them on a large scale for any host
possibly acting as DTLS server, or even unfeasible in
case of resource-constrained servers.
On the other hand, adopting a distributed archi-
tecture is beneficial in terms of robustness and avail-
ability, and avoids a single TA instance from being a
single point of failure. This requires to synchronize se-
quence number values and long term keys KMS be-
tween the different TA replicas. This work is not de-
voted to any specific approach for synchronizing TA
replicas, whose choice should take into account the ar-
chitectural, application-level, and security constraints
of the very infrastructure and domain the TA belongs
to. Further details about the actual authorization pro-
cess performed on the TA and practical architectural
design choices are out of the scope of this paper.
In the following, we refer to the application scenario
in Figure 4, and consider the presence of three distinct
entities, namely a DTLS server S, a DTLS client C, and
the Trust Anchor TA. In particular, we assume that the
TA is trustworthy and thus cannot be compromised by
an attacker. In addition, we consider S as associated to
this TA only, according to a mutual trust relation. Also,
Fig. 4 Application scenario
we assume that client C can rely on a service such as
the IETF Resource Directory [51] to know what is the
specific Trust Anchor TA associated to server S.
Finally, the communication between the TA and
C is required to be properly secured. To this end, a
possible straightforward approach relies on establish-
ing a TLS/DTLS session between the TA and C. On
one hand, this would move exactly the same DoS issue
discussed in Section 4.1 from the server S to the TA.
However, while it would be clearly impractical for every
generic host configured as DTLS server, the relatively
few deployed TAs can be implemented in such a way
to be adequately reliable and robust against the con-
sidered DoS attack, as previously discussed in this sec-
tion. On the other hand, the same key administration
issues discussed in Section 4.2 would be moved from the
server S to the TA. However, unlike generic, possibly
storage-constrained, hosts configured as DTLS servers,
it is reasonable that a TA is a special-purpose entity,
provided with plentiful of resources, and thus able to
properly manage a non negligible amount of pre-shared
keys. Besides, offloading DTLS servers from having to
manage a large number of shared secret keys is benefi-
cial from a whole system perspective, as it scales bet-
ter than provisioning pairwise shared keys between any
possible pair of clients and servers.
Nevertheless, in Section 6 we refer to a possible al-
ternative approach, in order to secure the communi-
cation between C and the TA without relying on any
pre-established association between the two parties.
6 Provisioning of security material
In this section, we describe an approach to generate
the necessary security material between C and S. Our
approach has the following benefits. First, it limits the
amount of generated security material, so minimizing
the number of involved cryptographic keys. Second, the
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security material is required to be provided to client
C only, while server S can implicitly derive it, thus
minimizing transmissions.
Hereafter, we assume that all entities C, S, and the
TA agree on a pseudo-random function PRF (·), which
produces an output whose size is 256 bits. In particular,
the considered PRF (·) function is based on a HMAC
function [52], and relies on the same data expansion
scheme adopted by DTLS and described in [1]. Further-
more, S and the TA secretly share i) a value seed ; ii) a
long term symmetric master key KM which is only used
to generate other security material; and, finally, iii) a
symmetric master session key KMS which is computed
as KMS = PRF (KM , seed). Specifically, we assume
that seed, KM , and KMS are 256 bits in size, and that
seed and KM have been pre-established during the ini-
tial configuration phase of S, also known as imprinting
[53]. An exhaustive list of the security material referred
throughout the paper is reported in Appendix A.
Before starting to perform a DTLS handshake with
S, client C must first contact the TA, in order to be au-
thorized to proceed further. In case the TA accepts such
a request, it provides C with four pieces of information,
as described below. This section considers a possible ap-
proach to secure the communication between C and the
TA. However, the adoption of alternative procedures is,
of course, possible and left open.
We denote a message M sent by host A to host B
and conveying a quantity Y as “M : A → B Y ”.
Also, by {x}K we denote the encryption of a quantity
x by means of key K. We assume that cryptographic
primitives are secure, and secrets have a size that dis-
courages an exhaustive search. Finally, we denote by
NC and by KC−TA a fresh nonce and a symmetric key
randomly generated by client C, respectively.
Upon contacting the TA for the very first time, C es-
tablishes a long term secret key KC−TA with the TA.
For instance, KC−TA can be established through the
procedure described in Appendix B, considering the
TA’s public key. Note that such a key establishment
will not be necessary when C contacts again the same
TA, regardless the specific DTLS server involved in the
handshake to be performed thereafter.
After having established KC−TA, and before open-
ing a new DTLS session with a server S, client C per-
forms the following message exchange with the TA.
M1 : C → TA < C, S,NC >
M2 : TA→ C < {SN,N,KS ,KS−C , NC}KC−TA >
Upon receiving message M1, the TA sends message M2
to client C, encrypting it by means of key KC−TA, and
including the nonce NC retrieved from message M1.
Upon receiving message M2, client C can retrieve its
content by means of key KC−TA, and verify that the
message is fresh thanks to the presence of nonce NC .
Then, C retrieves four pieces of information, namely
SN , N , KS and KS−C .
In particular, SN is a 32 bit sequence number as-
signed to S and managed by the TA. A given sequence
number value is associated to a specific DTLS session,
and does not change over time. The nonce N is a string
composed of a fixed tag containing information about
the issuer, recipient and target for this nonce, and the
sequence number SN. Finally, two 256 bit symmetric
keys are provided, namely KS−C = PRF (KMS , N) and
KS = PRF (KMS , SN). The key KS−C is used during
the DTLS handshake between client C and server S
(see Section 6.1), while KS is used to protect server
S from DoS against the DTLS handshake (see Section
7). If this exchange succeeds, the TA increments the
sequence number associated to the relevant server S.
Note that, in a practical implementation, it is im-
portant to guarantee that the TA does not exceed a
certain maximum rate when issuing sequence number
values, in order to prevent an attacker with legitimate
credentials from quickly consuming the sequence num-
ber space associated to the relevant S, and thus making
the TA unable to correctly serve other clients.
As discussed in Section 5, a distributed implementa-
tion of the TA would require synchronization between
the different TA replicas. In particular, synchronization
procedures may take time to propagate changes to all
the replicas. Yet, we believe that synchronizing a 4-
byte integer value between the different TA replicas is
not likely to result in a considerable impact in terms
of network latency. That is, synchronizing the sequence
number value among all the TA replicas is likely to
be affordable even after every single sequence number
value has been issued, before proceeding with issuing
the next value.
6.1 Derived Key Mode
In the following, we present our key provisioning scheme
based on the PSK approach [5], namely Derived Key
Mode. Basically, client C considers KS−C as the pre-
shared key (to be) shared with server S, and uses it
to generate the premaster secret. Then, while perform-
ing the DTLS handshake and preparing Flight 5, client
C writes the nonce N in the PSK identity field of the
DTLS ClientKeyExchange message (see Figure 2).
Upon receiving the DTLS ClientKeyExchange mes-
sage, server S retrieves the conveyed nonce N from the
PSK identity field. After that, S does not retrieve a pre-
shared symmetric key associated to client C, as usually
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assumed by the PSK approach. Instead, S uses nonce N
to compute the key KS−C as KS−C = PRF (KMS , N).
Then, the server considers KS−C to be the pre-shared
key shared with client C, and uses it to generate the
premaster secret. The latter is then used to derive the
master secret in order to generate the actual DTLS se-
curity material (see Section 3.3).
The Derived Key Mode described above has the fol-
lowing benefits. First, it makes the PSK scheme usable
also in non-closed, dynamic, environments, where po-
tential DTLS clients and servers do not necessarily have
an established security context. Second, it does not re-
quire to provide server S with multiple pre-shared keys
through any out-of-band provisioning methods. Third,
it avoids key re-provisioning of server S in case the set of
potential DTLS clients changes over time. This makes it
possible to manage dynamic trust relations without re-
provisioning individual DTLS servers. Fourth, since the
considered PRF (·) function relies on the same data ex-
pansion scheme adopted by the DTLS handshake, com-
puting the key KS−C does not significantly impact on
performance, i.e. the overall handshake maintains the
same order of computational complexity. Finally, our
approach requires a server to store only the key KMS
shared with the TA, so avoiding key management issues
and scaling well with the number of DTLS clients.
These benefits are achieved at the cost of moving
some load from server S to the TA and client C, which
needs to perform additional communication with the
TA. We believe that this is a good trade-off, which
expands the applicability of the PSK scheme beyond
pre-provisioned shared keys, so making it possible to
use it in scenarios with a large number of dynamically
changing communication partners, as could be found in
building automation or smart metering use cases.
The Derived Key Mode also requires the provision-
ing of key material between clients and the TA, as well
as between servers and the TA. This approach obvi-
ously scales better than provisioning pairwise shared
keys between all clients and servers. Furthermore, the
key material shared between servers and TAs can be
provisioned statically upon the enrollment of servers,
without any assumptions on which client will need to
access which server.
7 Counteracting DoS attack
In this section, we present our approach to protect a
DTLS server from the DoS attack discussed in Section
4.1. Our proposal represents an alternative to the stan-
dard Cookie approach described in [3], and is based on
sending a single and authenticated ClientHello message
upon initiating the DTLS handshake. Specifically, our
goal is to allow a DTLS server to detect invalid Clien-
tHello messages, and abort the associated DTLS hand-
shakes as soon as possible. To this end, we rely on the
key KS provided to client C by the TA and derived by
server S upon the reception of a ClientHello message.
Note that our countermeasure to DoS entirely takes
place during the first step of the DTLS handshake, and
is thus agnostic of following message exchanges. Hence,
it can be adopted in the presence of any key provision-
ing method considered by the DTLS client and server
later during the handshake. In the rest of this section,
we focus on the establishment of a new DTLS session.
For the reader’s convenience, we discuss minor differ-
ences during DTLS session resumption in Appendix D.
Upon starting a DTLS handshake, client C includes
a lightweight and short Message Authentication Code
(MAC) in the outgoing ClientHello message. Then, by
checking the validity of the conveyed MAC, server S is
able to promptly assert whether the received Clien-
tHello message is genuine or not, i.e. if it has been
sent by a legitimate DTLS client. In such a case, the
handshake can regularly proceed, otherwise a DoS at-
tack is assumed to be currently ongoing and the Clien-
tHello message is silently discarded. Unlike the Cookie
exchange, such a procedure does not require any addi-
tional handshake messages, so limiting the communica-
tion overhead on both the client and server side. Also, it
avoids possible amplification effects against other net-
work nodes altogether.
The MAC mentioned above can be computed us-
ing different types of standard algorithms and prin-
ciples, such as common HMAC functions [52] consid-
ered by the DTLS protocol itself. However, most stan-
dard MAC algorithms display a relatively long com-
putation time and produce output which is non neg-
ligible in size, hence introducing a significant commu-
nication overhead. Performing a simple truncation of
computed output is not a recommended solution, since
it would surely limit such an overhead, but would also
reduce MAC security, especially in terms of robustness
against forgery. In order to overcome such issues, our
approach refers to an unconditionally secure MAC con-
struction, which relies on universal hashing based on a
Galois Field multiplication construction [54][55]. This
construction has the specific advantage to assure a suffi-
cient low forgery probability also in case of MACs which
are small in size. In particular, hereafter we refer to a
MAC construction whose output is only 16 bits in size.
More details about the actual MAC computation pro-
cess are provided in Section 7.2.
In the rest of this section, we first discuss the pro-
cedure used to authenticate ClientHello messages, and
then describe the actual MAC computation process.
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7.1 ClientHello message authentication
In the following, we define a SecureHandshake Hello
Extension for ClientHello messages, according to the
guidelines provided in [1]. To this end, we define an











We also introduce the ExtensionData structure as
value for the extensionData field. This structure in-
cludes a sequenceNumber field, containing the value SN
which was provided to C by the TA (see Section 6). We
believe that a 32-bit field results in an acceptable and
fairly long amount of time, before the sequence number
space associated to a DTLS server gets exhausted, and
a new long term key KMS has to be established between
the DTLS server and the TA (see Appendix C). The re-
sumptionCounter field is used to provide replay protec-
tion, in case of DTLS session resumption (see Appendix
D). That is, it univocally identifies the next resumption
instance associated to a given DTLS session already
established between C and S. We believe that a 16-
bit field adequately accommodates most of the DTLS
clients’ needs to resume a previously opened session. Fi-
nally, the helloMAC field contains the computed MAC
associated to the ClientHello message. We believe that
a 16-bit MAC has a reasonable size to discourage the
DoS attack considered in Section 4.1. Also, we would
like to point out that the purpose of this MAC is not to
provide any authenticity of the whole ClientHello mes-
sage, but only to be a deterrent against the considered
DoS attack. If we assume that both the extensionType
and extensionSize fields are 2 bytes each in size, then
our Hello Extension is overall 12 bytes in size.
Before starting a DTLS handshake with server S,
client C performs the following steps.
1. Client C contacts the TA, and receives a sequence
number SN and a session key KS (see Section 6).
2. Client C derives a key KMAC which will be used to
compute the MAC for the ClientHello message. In
particular, KMAC = PRF (KS , ”new session”).
3. Then, client C creates an instance of the Secure-
Handshake extension presented above, and includes
it in the ClientHello message to be sent to S. The
sequenceNumber and resumptionCounter fields are
initialized to SN and 0, respectively.
4. Client C computes a MAC v, relying on the key
KMAC and a Galois Field multiplication construc-
tion based on a 16 bit Galois Field [54]. The MAC
computation takes as input also our SecureHand-
shake extension, although only the sequenceNumber
and resumptionCounter fields are considered.
5. Finally, client C writes the computed MAC v in the
helloMAC field of the SecureHandshake extension.
After that, client C starts the DTLS handshake by
sending the ClientHello message to server S. Client C is
supposed to store key KS in case the associated DTLS
session might be resumed in the future. The key KMAC
is discarded, as a new different one will be generated in
case of session resumption (see Appendix D).
Upon receiving the ClientHello message, server S re-
trieves the SecureHandshake extension, and performs
the following steps.
1. First, server S checks that the resumptionCounter
field is set to 0, in order to verify that the received
message is consistent with the establishment of a
new DTLS session.
2. Then, server S retrieves SN from the sequenceNum-
ber field, and computes KS = PRF (KMS , SN) and
KMAC = PRF (KS , ”new session”). Since the con-
sidered PRF (·) function relies on the same data ex-
pansion scheme adopted by the DTLS handshake
itself and described in [1], computing the keys KS
and KMAC does not significantly impact on per-
formance, i.e. the overall handshake maintains the
same order of computational complexity.
3. Then, server S computes a MAC v∗ by means of
KMAC and the Galois Field multiplication construc-
tion, taking as input the whole ClientHello message
but the helloMAC field of the SecureHandshake ex-
tension.
4. Finally, server S compares the resulting MAC v∗
with the MAC v carried within the SecureHand-
shake extension. In case of negative match, the mes-
sage is considered invalid and is silently discarded.
Instead, in case of valid MAC, server S assumes that
the message has been sent by a legitimate client, and
continues to perform the DTLS handshake without
any Cookie exchange with client C, i.e. S proceeds
with the transmission of the ServerHello message.
7.2 MAC computation
In this section, we describe the actual computation of
the 16 bit MAC used to authenticate ClientHello mes-
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sages (see Section 7.1). Note that the procedure dis-
cussed in this paper is only one among several possible
ways to perform the MAC computation. Nevertheless,
since the resulting output is an unconditionally secure
MAC [56], and the algorithms used to produce it have
been extensively studied in terms of correctness and
complexity [54][55], we strongly believe that the sug-
gested method is close to be optimal in terms of sim-
plicity and computational efficiency. Therefore, it does
not significantly contribute to the computing overhead
of DTLS client and server, i.e. the handshake process
maintains the same order of computational complexity.
Having defined the MAC to be 16 bits in size, we
assume that elements involved in the MAC computa-
tion are 16 bits in size as well. This is done only for the
sake of simplicity in the following description, while it
is clearly possible to rely on elements of different sizes.
Also, we denote GF (216) as a Galois field with a size of
16 bits [54], and define a, b, c ∈ GF (216) as 16 bit key
values, which are valid only for the establishment (or re-
sumption) of a single specific DTLS session. Given the
key KMAC = PRF (KS , ”new session”) introduced in
Section 7, the keys a, b, and c are defined as follows.
Key a coincides with the bits of KMAC ranging from
position 0 to position 15; key b coincides with the bits
of KMAC ranging from position 16 to position 31; key c
coincides with the bits of KMAC ranging from position
31 to position 47.
Now, let us consider the ClientHello message M as
divided into a number of equally sized chunks of 16 bits
each, and refer to the i-th chunk as mi. Then, assum-
ing message M to be bM bits in size, we can represent
it as the concatenation of n = d(bM/16)e chunks, i.e.
M = {m0||m1||...||mn−1}, where m0,m1, ...,mn−1 ∈
GF (216). Hence, the 16 bit MAC v associated to mes-
sage M is computed as
v = (m0 + a ·m1 + ... + an−1 ·mn−1) · b + c
8 Replay protection
Let us assume that an adversary intercepts and stores
a valid ClientHello message, i.e. including the Secure-
Handshake extension, which has been previously sent
to S by a legitimate client. Then, she can retransmit
such an old message to S, which would consider it valid
and proceed to perform the DTLS handshake up to
Flight 4. In this section, we discuss a possible way to
address such an issue, and protect our countermeasure
from replay of old ClientHello messages. Specifically, in
the following we refer only to the establishment of new
DTLS sessions. For the reader’s convenience, Appendix
D describes how our approach can provide replay pro-
tection during resumption of old DTLS sessions.
We assume that server S relies on a sliding window
mechanism defined as follows. Let us denote a sliding
window W of size A as a pair {w,wb}. Specifically, w
is a vector composed of A bits, thus requiring d(A/8)e
bytes. Instead, wb indicates the current left bound of
the window W . That is, upon receiving a ClientHello
message, wb represents the lowest acceptable value car-
ried in the sequenceNumber field of the SecureHand-
shake extension. Upon S startup, wb as well as all bits
of w are initialized to 0.
Note that the A value should be chosen according
to the expected frequency of DTLS session requests on
server S, and in order to deal as best as possible with the
unreliable message delivery due to datagram transport
protocols. Of course, the larger the sliding window, the
more accurate and resilient is the protection against
replay attacks, but the greater the amount of required
memory on the server side.
Upon receiving a ClientHello message aimed at es-
tablishing a new DTLS session, i.e. the session ID field
is empty, server S retrieves the sequence number SN
from the sequenceNumber field of the SecureHandshake
extension. Then, the following checks are performed.
Case 1. If SN < wb, the message is considered too old
and is silently discarded.
Case 2. If wb ≤ SN < min(wb + A, 232), S defines
i = (SN − wb), and checks the i-th bit of vector w. If
such a bit is set to 1, i.e. the same SN has been previ-
ously used, then the received message is considered to
be a replay and is silently discarded. Instead, if such a
bit is set to 0, S proceeds with the ClientHello message
processing including the MAC verification, as described
in Section 7.1. Then, in case the message is invalid, it is
silently discarded. Otherwise, S continues to regularly
perform the DTLS handshake.
Case 3. If (wb + A) ≤ SN < 232, S proceeds with
the ClientHello message processing including the MAC
verification, as described in Section 7.1. In case the mes-
sage is invalid, it is silently discarded. Otherwise, S con-
tinues to regularly perform the DTLS handshake.
Once the DTLS handshake has been completed, S
checks whether the condition SN ≥ wb is still valid. In
such a case, the sliding window W is updated as follows.
Case A. If wb ≤ SN < min(wb + A, 232), S defines
i = (SN −wb) and sets the i-th bit of vector w to 1, so
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marking the sequence number SN as used.
Case B. If (wb + A) ≤ SN < 232, S defines wnew as
wnew = (SN − A + 1). Then, S updates vector w as
w = w  (wnew − wb). Specifically, “” is the un-
signed right bit shift operator, i.e. the leftmost position
of vector w is filled with 0. After that, S updates wb as
wb = wnew. Finally, S defines i = (SN − wb) and sets
the i-th bit of vector w to 1, so marking the sequence
number SN as used.
Once all possible values of SN have been used on
the TA, the latter has to provide server S with a new
key K+MS (see Appendix C). However, it is possible
that when it receives such a new key K+MS , the server
S has not yet received all ClientHello messages associ-
ated to the SN remaining values. In this case, S saves
the current window W and key KMS , as W
∗ ←W and
K∗MS ← KMS . Then, the sliding window W is reinitial-
ized, i.e. all bits of vector w are set to 0 and wb = 0. Af-
ter that, new ClientHello messages with fresh SN values
{0, 1, ...} will be processed, referring to the reinitialized
sliding window W , and the new key K+MS . However,
for a given amount of time T , the server S considers
also late ClientHello messages conveying an SN value
x such that w∗b ≤ x < 232. Such messages are pro-
cessed by referring to the sliding window W ∗ and the
key K∗MS , according to the same update procedure de-
scribed above. Of course, T is supposed to be much less
than the amount of time practically needed to observe
two consecutive wrap arounds of SN values on the TA.
9 Experimental evaluation
In order to evaluate performance of our approach, we
did a proof of concept Java implementation of the addi-
tional security services described in Sections 6.1, 7, and
8. Specifically, we referred to the Constrained Appli-
cation Protocol (CoAP) [8], a lightweight application
protocol designed by the IETF working group CoRE
[9], which explicitly relies on DTLS to provide secure
communication, if requested. In particular, we consid-
ered the Java library Californium [7], which provides
a full implementation of the CoAP protocol. Also, we
properly extended the Java library Scandium [6], which
implements DTLS 1.2 [3] in a stand-alone way, although
it has been primarily designed to work together with
Californium on top.
In the following, we discuss the resulting memory
footprint of our implementation, as well as the overall
transaction length experienced on the client side and
the processing overhead introduced by our approach.
Also, we evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in
the presence of an actual DoS attack launched against
a DTLS server.
Compared with the original version of Californium
and Scandium, our security services, even without any
optimizations, result in additional 23.17 KB (+5.99%)
and 21.45 KB (+5.57%) of memory on the client and
server side, respectively. This suggests that an opti-
mized implementation in C or Assembly-like languages
is very likely suitable to memory constrained platforms.
In order to evaluate our approach, we ran a set of
experimental tests on an ethernet local network, consid-
ering either a system relying on the original DTLS pro-
tocol based on the Cookie exchange, or a system relying
on DTLS together with our additional security services.
More in detail, first we ran our Java based test environ-
ment relying on the Cookie exchange mechanism and
the original pre-shared key establishment based on the
PSK approach [5] described in Section 3.3. Then, we
relied on the same setup and performed the very same
experiments, but in the presence of our security ser-
vices, i.e. the Derived Key Mode scheme presented in
Section 6.1, and the protection against the DoS attack
described in Sections 7 and 8. Such sets of experiments
allow us to compare our security services with respect to
a system based on the original DTLS protocol, in terms
of transaction length, processing overhead, and effec-
tiveness against DoS attacks. All results have been av-
eraged over 20 independent repetitions, and confidence
intervals have been derived, with 95% confidence level.
In the presence of our security services, we also con-
sider the preliminary interaction between C and the
TA to provide the client with all the necessary security
material (see Section 6). Then, we consider the follow-
ing simple application. First, the DTLS client C and
server S establish a secure connection by performing a
DTLS handshake. Then, client C sends a CoAP GET
request to server S, which replies with a CoAP response
message whose payload size is set to 623 bytes. Finally,
client C terminates the DTLS session with server S.
Furthermore, we relied on the DTLS cryptosuite
TLS PSK WITH AES 128 CCM 8 [57], which assumes
the execution of a pre-shared key DTLS handshake,
is based on a single authenticated encryption opera-
tion, and provides both confidentiality and data ori-
gin authentication. Also, the adopted pseudo-random
function PRF (·) is based on the specific hash function
SHA-256 [58]. As to the preliminary interaction be-
tween client C and the TA, we referred to the message
exchange described in Section 6, and considered RSA
[59] and AES [60] when protecting messages M1 and
M2, respectively.
Besides, the server S implements a handshake time-
out, i.e. a session establishment is aborted in case the
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DTLS hansdhake is not successfully completed within
a maximum amount of time. This forces the adversary
to continue performing the attack even after the maxi-
mum amount of (half) open sessions has been reached,
in order to keep the server unavailable.
To perform our tests, we considered generic hard-
ware platforms running Java SE runtime environment
(version 1.8.0 45). More in detail, the host acting as
DTLS client C was a common desktop PC with 4 GB
of RAM and an Intel i5-3570 CPU, while the DTLS
server S was a laptop PC with 4 GB of RAM and an
Intel i5-3317U CPU. The host acting as the TA was
a desktop PC with 4 GB of RAM and an Intel Core2
CPU. Finally, in case of attack performance, the host
acting as the adversary was a desktop PC with 8 GB
of RAM and an Intel i7-3517UE CPU.
In the following, we first consider an attack-free sce-
nario, and separately present evaluation results referred
to the client and server side, in Sections 9.1 and 9.2, re-
spectively. Then, we provide a discussion of such results
in Section 9.3. Finally, in Section 9.4, we consider the
execution of an actual DoS attack against server S, in
the presence of either the original DTLS protocol or
our security services, and discuss attack effects on the
server robustness and availability.
9.1 Client results
In this section, we present our experimental results re-
ferred to client C. In particular, the following metrics
have been considered on the client side.
ClientHello preparation. Time spent by C to pre-
pare the ClientHello message. In case the original DTLS
protocol is considered, this time refers to the first Clien-
tHello message generated and sent by C. Instead, in the
presence of our security services, this time encompasses
also the preparation of the SecureHandshake extension.
ClientKeyExchange preparation. Time spent by
C to prepare the ClientKeyExchange message. Note
that, in case the original DTLS protocol is considered,
the pre-shared key is directly retrieved from a locally
stored set. Instead, in the presence of our security ser-
vices, the pre-shared key coincides with the key KS−C
previously obtained from the TA (see Section 6).
Handshake duration. Time spent by C to complete
the DTLS handshake.
Transaction length. Time spent from when the ap-
plication on C produces the CoAP request message to
when the associated CoAP response message is received
back from server S. Note that this encompasses also
the time spent to perform the DTLS handshake. In the
presence of our security services, it comprises also the






ClientHello 8.634 ms 9.509 ms
preparation ± 0.070 ms ± 0.022 ms
2
ClientKeyExchange 4.404 ms 4.062 ms
preparation ± 0.634 ms ± 0.446 ms
3
Handshake 224.108 ms 206.215 ms
duration ± 2.338 ms ± 1.949 ms
4
Transaction 245.3 ms 230.95 ms
length ± 2.396 ms ± 2.441 ms
Table 1 Client performance
Our results are reported in Table 1. The columns
“Original DTLS” and “Alternative DTLS” refer to the
original DTLS protocol and our extended implementa-
tion, respectively.
In the presence of our security services, the pre-
liminary interaction between C and the TA resulted
in the following overhead. As to the establishment of
key KC−TA (see Appendix B), the client experienced
a round trip time equal to 22.95 ms ± 0.652 ms. Also,
the client experiences a computing overhead equal to
101.373 ms ± 0.229 ms (29.436 ms ± 0.375 ms), to pro-
cess the message sent to (received from) the TA. We
recall that this key establishment is performed only the
very first time that the client contacts the TA.
As to the actual key material exchange through mes-
sages M1 and M2 (see Section 6), the client experienced
a round trip time equal to 19.35 ms ± 0.612 ms. Also,
the client experienced a computing overhead equal to
0.029 ms ± 0.0002 ms and 33.465 ms ± 0.323 ms, to
process message M1 and M2, respectively.
9.2 Server results
In this section, we present our experimental results re-
ferred to server S. In particular, the following metrics
have been considered on the server side.
ClientHello processing. Time spent by S to process
the first ClientHello message received from client C.
In case the original DTLS protocol is considered, this
time actually refers to the first ClientHello message re-
ception, upon which only few lightweight operations are
performed. Conversely, in the presence of our security
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services, this time refers to the only received ClientHello
message, and includes the performance of anti-replay
checks and the MAC verification.
HelloVerifyRequest preparation. Time spent by S
to prepare the HelloVerifyRequest message. This is rel-
evant only if the original DTLS protocol is considered.
Second ClientHello processing. Time spent by S to
process the second ClientHello message received from
client C, and conveying the DTLS Cookie. This is rele-
vant only if the original DTLS protocol is considered.
Check phase duration. Time spent by S between
the reception of the first ClientHello message and the
starting of Flight 4 preparation. Practically, this met-
ric represents the time spent by S to infer if the DTLS
handshake is valid or not.
PSK computation. Time spent by S to derive the pre-
shared key, upon reception of the ClientKeyExchange
message from client C. We recall that, in case the orig-
inal DTLS protocol is considered, the pre-shared key
is directly retrieved from a locally stored set. Instead,
in the presence of our security services, the pre-shared
key KS−C is computed from the received nonce N con-
veyed in the PSK identity field of the ClientKeyEx-
change message (see Section 6.1).
ClientKeyExchange processing. Time spent by S
to process the DTLS ClientKeyExchange message re-
ceived from client C. This encompasses also the retrieval
or computation of the pre-shared key, in case the origi-
nal DTLS protocol or our security services are consid-
ered, respectively.
Handshake duration. Time spent by S to complete
the DTLS handshake. In the presence of our security
services, this encompasses also the update of the anti-
replay sliding window (see Section 8), and the manage-
ment of information for DTLS session resumption.
Our results are reported in Table 2. The columns
“Original DTLS” and “Alternative DTLS” refer to the
original DTLS protocol and our extended implemen-
tation, respectively. Furthermore, we provide a graph-
ical overview of the server S performance in Figure 5.
The bars “DTLS Flight 1-3 processing duration” indi-
cate the time spent during the check phase to process





ClientHello 0.005 ms 1.997 ms
processing ± 0.0006 ms ± 0.402 ms
2
HelloVerifyRequest 0.470 ms −
preparation ± 0.060 ms
3
Second ClientHello 0.269 ms −
processing ± 0.056 ms
4
Check phase 20.935 ms 10.116 ms
duration ± 1.463 ms ± 0.836 ms
5 PSK computation
0.007 ms 0.340 ms
± 0.0001 ms ± 0.095 ms
6
ClientKeyExchange 2.084 ms 2.200 ms
processing ± 0.429 ms ± 0.565 ms
7
Handshake 138.576 ms 127.359 ms
duration ± 2.220 ms ± 1.895 ms









































Fig. 5 Overview of server performance
9.3 Discussion
In the following, we discuss experimental results re-
ported in Sections 9.1 and 9.2. We denote as COi and C
A
i
the metrics associated to client C and reported in the
i-th row of Table 1, in case the original DTLS protocol
or our alternative implementation is considered, respec-
tively. Similarly, we denote as SOi and S
A
i the metrics
associated to server S and reported in the i-th row of
Table 2, in case the original DTLS protocol or our al-
ternative implementation is considered, respectively.
First of all, results presented in Tables 1 and 2 show
that the overall handshake duration in the presence of
our security services is even smaller than the hand-
shake duration displayed by the original DTLS pro-






7 . The same can
be observed with reference to the transaction length
on the client side, i.e. CA4 < C
O
4 . Such results can be
explained as follows. On one hand, our security ser-
vices result in an extended processing of the only Clien-
tHello message, both on the client and server side. Also,
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as highlighted by the rightmost bar pair in Figure 5,
the time required on the server side to process the
only (enhanced) ClientHello message is longer than the
overall time required to process the original two Clien-
tHello messages and the HelloVerifyRequest message,






3 . On the other hand, our se-
curity services make it possible to avoid the transmis-
sion/reception and processing of two handshake mes-
sages, i.e. the HelloVerifyRequest and the second Clien-
tHello message conveying the Cookie, thus reducing the
overall handshake duration. Note that our evaluation
has been performed in a local network, so minimazing
the impact due to the communication overhead. This
suggests that in a more general communication context,
e.g. the Internet, our approach should result in a more
relevant reduction of the DTLS handshake duration.
Second, let us refer to TCA = 52.84 ms as the time
spent by C to complete the preliminary interaction with
the TA, in the presence of our security services. This
takes into account the round trip time experienced by
C, as well as its computing overhead to process mes-
sages M1 and M2 (see Section 9.1). Then, the overall
time required by C to i) interact with the TA; ii) per-
form the DTLS handshake with S ; and iii) perform the
actual CoAP transaction, is equal to the sum of TCA
and the transaction length CA4 . Such a total time, i.e.
283.79 ms, is comparable with the transaction length
in the presence of the original DTLS handshake, i.e.
CO4 = 245.3 ms. This suggests that, even considering
also the preliminary interaction between C and the TA,
our security services do not substantially affect network
performance from the client standpoint. We recall that
such an interaction with the TA is required only upon
starting a new DTLS session with S, i.e. only before
sending the first application message.
Finally, if we focus on the server side, we observe
that our security services result in a check phase which
is considerably shorter than in the presence of the orig-
inal DTLS handshake, i.e. SA4 < S
O
4 . As highlighted
in Figure 5, this means that our approach asserts the
genuineness of a DTLS session establishment earlier
than original DTLS. Also, in the presence of the origi-
nal DTLS handshake, after such a check phase, server
S might still be victim of a DoS attack performed with
a valid spoofed IP address, which can also result in
an amplification attack against other network nodes,
as discussed in Section 4.1. Instead, our security ser-
vices assure that, once the check phase has been com-
pleted, the current DTLS handshake is either invalid
(and likely an actual DoS attack), or authentic and in-
volving a legitimate DTLS client. As discussed above
for the overall handshake duration, we believe that in
a more general communication context, such as the In-
ternet, the impact due to the communication overhead
would further increase the gap between the two check
phase durations SO4 and S
A
4 , in case either the original
DTLS handshake or our additions are considered, so
making our approach even more advantageous.
9.4 Performance and effectiveness under attack
In this section, we consider an adversary who repeat-
edly performs the DoS attack described in Section 4.1,
and present experimental results referred to when either
our approach or the original one based on the Cookie
exchange is adopted. In particular, we first discuss the
impact of a single attack occurrence on server perfor-
mance. Then, we show that our approach is consis-
tently more effective in preserving robustness and ser-
vice availability on the server side, in case a continuous
DoS attack is performed.
In order to evaluate the impact of a single attack
occurrence, we considered the following two metrics.
Attack processing. Overall time spent by server S to
process handshake messages during one attack occur-
rence. In case the original DTLS protocol is considered,
this time encompasses the processing of the two Clien-
tHello messages, the HelloVerifyRequest message, and
the DTLS Flight 4. Conversely, in the presence of our
security services, this time coincides with the process-
ing of the only invalid ClientHello message.
Attack exposure. Time spent under attack by server
S, upon a single occurrence of the DoS attack. In case
the original DTLS protocol is considered, this time is
measured from the reception of the first ClientHello
message to the end of the transmission of Flight 4.
Conversely, in the presence of our security services, this
time is measured from the reception of the only invalid





Attack 1.626 ms 1.532 ms
processing ± 0.265 ms ± 0.124 ms
2
Attack 27.860 ms 10.426 ms
exposure ± 1.867 ms ± 1.806 ms
Table 3 Server performance under attack
Our results are reported in Table 3. The columns
“Original DTLS” and “Alternative DTLS” refer to the
original DTLS protocol and our extended implementa-
tion, respectively. We denote as DOi and D
A
i the metrics
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associated to server S and reported in the i-th row of
Table 3, in case the original DTLS protocol or our al-
ternative implementation is considered, respectively.
First of all, our approach results in overall less pro-
cessing on the server side, i.e. DA1 < D
O
1 . Also, the pro-
cessing time DA1 is shorter than the processing time S
A
1
in Table 2 and referred to an attack-free scenario. This
is consistent with the fact that an invalid ClientHello
message results in a reduced set of operations, i.e. the
management of the anti-replay window and the DTLS
session initialization operations are not performed.
In addition, the original DTLS server remains ex-
posed to an attack occurrence for DO2 = 27.860 ms, i.e.
until the DTLS Flight 4 has been sent. We recall that,
after that, the server maintains a half open DTLS ses-
sion, and is not able to state whether it is valid or not.
Instead, our alternative approach results in the server
S exposed for less than half that time, i.e. DA2 < D
O
2 .
Also, after such an amount of time, S is certain that
an invalid ClientHello message has been received, and
no DTLS session is maintained. As discussed in Section
9.3, we believe that in a more general communication
context, such as the Internet, the impact due to the
communication overhead would further increase the gap
between the two attack exposure times DO2 and D
A
2 , so
making our approach even more advantageous.
In the following, we report results obtained in the
presence of a continuous DoS attack performed against
server S. Derived confidence intervals are very small
and cannot be appreciated in the presented graphs. In
particular, our experiments refer to the following setup.
Server S was configured to maintain at most a given
amount M of open DTLS sessions. That is, in case
such a limit is reached, S does not perform any fur-
ther DTLS handshake, until at least one DTLS session
has been closed. We considered 300, 400, and 500 as
possible values of M .
Furthermore, every 500 ms, a legitimate client C
interacts with S as follows. First, C performs a full
DTLS handshake with S, so establishing a secure ses-
sion. Then, C performs a CoAP message exchange, af-
ter which the DTLS session is terminated with mutual
agreement. Finally, the attacker host runs 3 parallel
adversary processes, each one of which repeatedly per-
forms a DoS attack against S every I milliseconds. We
denote I also as attack interval, and considered 50 ms,
100 ms, and 150 ms as possible values.
For the sake of proving our point with our proof of
concept test environment, we considered a handshake
timeout on the DTLS server equal to 30 seconds. Given
the adversary considered in our experiments, this time-
out effectively forces her to perform the attack indefi-
nitely over time, in order to keep the server unavailable.
This allows us to show that, in the presence of the orig-
inal DTLS protocol, the considered adversary performs
a successful attack which results in the server always
starting invalid sessions faster than how it aborts them.
In general, the timeout should be set at least to a
value Th such that the adversary is not able to start the
establishment of M half open sessions within a time in-
terval equal to Th. While, on one hand, smaller values
of Th would force the adversary to perform a more ag-
gressive attack, on the other hand they would make it
harder to address session establishments in the presence
of several, legitimate, slower clients. Note that this is
not an issue when our security services are adopted,
as a fake session establishment is immediately aborted























Original DTLS, Attack interval = 50 ms
Original DTLS, Attack interval = 100 ms
Original DTLS, Attack interval = 150 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 50 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 100 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 150 ms























Original DTLS, Max sessions = 500
Original DTLS, Max sessions = 400
Original DTLS, Max sessions = 300
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 500
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 400
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 300
Fig. 7 Open sessions (Attack interval 150 ms)
Figures 6 and 7 depict the number of DTLS sessions
open on server S over time, considering both the orig-
inal DTLS protocol and our extended implementation.
In particular, Figure 6 focuses on M = 500 maximum
open sessions, while Figure 7 considers an attack inter-
val I = 150 ms.
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More in detail, Figure 6 shows that, in the pres-
ence of the original DTLS protocol, server S keeps on
opening invalid sessions until the maximum amount M
has been reached. When this happens, S stops accept-
ing new ClientHello messages, even if from legitimate
clients. Since the adversary continuously performs the
attack, new half open sessions will continuously replace
the ones terminated upon handshake timeout expira-
tion. Thus, from then on, S becomes practically un-
available. Note that the time required to have M (half)
open sessions on S is shorter when a shorter attack in-
terval I is considered, i.e. in case of a more intensive
DoS attack.
Conversely, our approach promptly detects invalid
ClientHello messages, so allowing S to establish only
valid sessions with legitimate clients. As a consequence,
the number of open sessions remains low over time even
during the DoS attack, for every considered value of the
attack interval I.
Similar considerations hold for Figure 7. In the pres-
ence of the original DTLS, the time required to have M
(half) open sessions on S is shorter when a smaller value
of M is considered, i.e. in case S features a reduced
amount of resources. On the contrary, our approach al-
lows S to perform only genuine DTLS handshakes, thus
keeping the number of open sessions low over time, for
every considered value of M . These results prove that
our alternative approach considerably increases the ro-

























Original DTLS, Attack interval = 150 ms
Original DTLS, Attack interval = 100 ms
Original DTLS, Attack interval = 50 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 150 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 100 ms
Alternative DTLS, Attack interval = 50 ms
Fig. 8 Served client requests (Max 500 sessions)
Figures 8 and 9 show the total amount of legiti-
mate client requests served by server S after a given
time, considering both the original DTLS protocol and
our extended implementation. In particular, Figure 8
focuses on M = 500 maximum open sessions, while
Figure 9 considers an attack interval I = 150 ms.
More in detail, Figure 8 shows that, in the presence
of the original DTLS protocol, the number of times that

























Original DTLS, Max sessions = 500
Original DTLS, Max sessions = 400
Original DTLS, Max sessions = 300
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 500
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 400
Alternative DTLS, Max sessions = 300
Fig. 9 Served client requests (Attack interval 150 ms)
tion grows until M sessions have been opened on the
server side. When this happens, S becomes unavailable
to serve even client C, and thus the number of served le-
gitimate requests stops growing. Moreover, if a lower at-
tack interval I is considered, i.e. the DoS attack is more
intensive, S becomes unavailable after a shorter amount
of time, hence further reducing the number of served
legitimate requests. Conversely, our approach prevents
S from creating invalid half open sessions altogether.
Therefore, requests from client C are normally served,
i.e. their number regularly keeps growing over time.
Similar considerations hold for Figure 9. In the pres-
ence of the original DTLS protocol, a lower value of
M implies that S becomes unavailable after a shorter
amount of time, and the number of served requests from
client C is consistently reduced. On the contrary, in the
presence of our approach, S is always able to serve re-
quests from client C, i.e. their number regularly grows
over time for every considered value of M . Such results
prove that our approach effectively preserves the avail-
ability of S during a continuous DoS attack.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed two significant issues
affecting the DTLS handshake. First, a DTLS server
is vulnerable to a DoS attack aimed at starting a con-
siderable number of half open sessions. This can ex-
haust memory and network resources on the server, so
making it less responsive or even unavailable to legiti-
mate clients. Second, the DTLS key provisioning based
on pre-shared keys may require the server to store a
considerable number of cryptographic keys. Then, it
may result in scalability issues, and complicates key
re-provisioning in dynamic scenarios.
We have proposed a single and efficient security ar-
chitecture, which practically neutralizes the DoS at-
tack by substantially limiting its impact, and requires
the server to store only one symmetric key in case the
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pre-shared key mode is used. Our approach does not
require changes to the DTLS standard, does not re-
quire additional communication between DTLS client
and server, and is deployable also in the TLS protocol
without changing the actual standard.
Furthermore, we have presented experimental re-
sults obtained with a proof of concept implementation,
and compared our approach with the original one based
on the Cookie exchange. We have shown that, in the
presence of a DoS attack, our approach considerably
improves a DTLS server in terms of robustness and ser-
vice availability. Also, it consistently reduces the time
a DTLS server is exposed to an attack instance, and
requires a shorter amount of time to complete a hand-
shake execution. As a future work, we will investigate
possible reactive strategies to further reduce the impact
of DoS attack, upon its detection on the server side.
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Appendix A
In this section, we summarize the security material referred
throughout the paper. Specifically, Tables 4 and 5 report the
security material either pre-installed on the involved entities,
or derived at runtime upon the occurrence of specific events,
respectively. Also, for each entry, both tables report a brief
description of the referred piece of information, as well as
what network entities own it.
Name Description Owners Purpose
KC−TA
Long term key to
C,TA
Interaction












Key used for KS S,TA
DoS
and KS−C derivation protection
W Anti replay window S
Replay
protection









Left bound of the
S
Replay
anti replay window protection
Table 4 Pre-installed security material







Key used for the
S,C
DoS
actual MAC computation protection
KS−C Derived pre-shared key S,C
PSK
provisioning
Table 5 Derived security material
Appendix B
This section describes a possible approach to exchange the
long term secret key KC−TA between client C and the TA.
The adoption of alternative procedures is, of course, possible
and left open.
In particular, we denote by NA a fresh nonce randomly
generated by client C, and by K+TA the public key associated
to the TA. Upon contacting the TA for the very first time,
C performs the following message exchange.
MA : C → TA < C,NA, {NA,KC−TA}K+TA >
MB : TA→ C < {C, TA,NA}KC−TA >
Since it is encrypted by means of key K+TA, the TA is sup-
posed to be the only entity able to retrieve key KC−TA from
message MA. Then, the TA sends message MB to client C,
encrypting it by means of key KC−TA, and including client
nonce NA retrieved from message MA. Upon receiving mes-
sage MB, client C verifies that the message is fresh thanks
to the presence of nonce NA, and has the confirmation that
KC−TA has been correctly established with the TA.
In principle, C can get the public key K+TA from the
Resource Directory service, upon contacting it to know what
is the specific TA associated to server S (see Section 5). As
an alternative, C can get the public key K+TA from a trusted
Certification Authority. Note that C is required to retrieve
the TA’s public key and establish the key KC−TA only once,
i.e. upon contacting that specific TA for the first time.
Appendix C
Although it practically takes a considerable amount of time,
the sequence number space maintained by the TA and as-
sociated to a server S eventually gets exhausted. When this
happens, the TA needs to perform a rekeying with the associ-
ated server, in order to avoid reusing old session keys, which
would open up for DoS attacks.
Practically, when a wrap-around of SN values occurs on
the TA, the latter temporarily stops accepting connection
requests associated to S from any DTLS client. Then, the
TA generates a new random seed value seed+ and a new key
K+MS = PRF (KM , seed
+). From now on, the TA considers
K+MS as the new master session key, i.e. KMS ← K+MS .
After that, the TA securely provides server S with seed+.
This can be done by means of a secure channel pre-established
between S and the TA, or through an ad-hoc key distribu-
tion protocol. Further details about the actual provisioning
of seed+ to server S are out of the scope of this paper. Fi-
nally, the TA resumes to regularly accept connection requests
associated to S.
Once received seed+, server S computes K+MS as K
+
MS =
PRF (KM , seed+), and sets it as the new master session key,
i.e. KMS ← K+MS . Hereafter, the TA and S can reuse old
values of SN , relying on the new master session key to derive
session keys KS .
Appendix D
In this section, we describe how to address possible replays
of ClientHello messages aimed at resuming previously estab-
lished DTLS sessions, i.e. conveying a non empty session ID
field [1]. Note that such a replay attack is considerably more
difficult to be performed, as well as less convenient from the
adversary standpoint. In fact, she would require to know the
exact session s to be resumed, especially as to the associ-
ated session ID value. Also, the attack would be even less
effective than the one against new session establishment, be-
cause of the reduced number of handshake messages involved
and their smaller size. Besides, this would also further reduce
the impact on other network nodes in terms of amplification
effects.
In the following, we assume that client C maintains a local
resumption counter RCs for each resumable session s previ-
ously established with server S. Specifically, RCs is initialized
to 0 after the first establishment of session s. Instead, on the
server side, we assume that the cache table TS maintained by
S to manage resumable DTLS sessions (see [1]) contains also
the following two pieces of information, separately for each
entry E. First, a resumption counter RCs is used to indi-
cate the next expected value of the resumptionCounter field
in the SecureHandshake extension, upon receiving a Clien-
tHello message aimed at resuming an old DTLS session s.
Second, a boolean flag Fs whose value is TRUE if, after the
first establishment of session s, the key KMS shared with the
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TA has not been renewed, and can thus be regularly used.
Upon creating the cache entry Es associated to a just estab-
lished session s, server S initializes the RCs and Fs fields to
0 and TRUE, respectively. As described in Section 8, upon
receiving a new master session key K+MS , server S stores the
expired one as K∗MS , i.e. K
∗
MS ← KMS . Also, S invalidates
all entries in the cache table TS , by setting to FALSE their
flag fields Fs.
Upon requesting to resume an old DTLS session s, client
C specifies the current value of its own RCs in the resump-
tionCounter field of the SecureHandshake extension of the
ClientHello message. Then, client C derives the key KMAC =
PRF (KS , resumptionCounter), which will be used for the
MAC computation. After that, such a message is processed
according to the same procedure described in Section 7.1,
which considers also the resumptionCounter field as input to
the ClientHello message authentication. Finally, C sends the
ClientHello message to server S.
Upon receiving such a message, S retrieves the resump-
tionCounter value RCs from the SecureHandshake extension.
In case RCs differs from the value stored in the cache en-
try Es, the received message is assumed to be a replay and
is silently discarded. Otherwise, S checks the flag Fs in the
cache entry Es, and processes the ClientHello message as de-
scribed in Section 7.1. In particular, S considers either key
KMS or key K∗MS in case Fs is set to TRUE or FALSE, re-
spectively. As to the MAC check, S relies on a key KMAC
computed as KMAC = PRF (KS , resumptionCounter). If
the ClientHello message has found to be valid, S proceeds as
follows.
In case the flag Fs is set to FALSE, S removes the cache
entry Es from table TS , and replies to client C with a DTLS
user canceled error alert message [1], so indicating that ses-
sion s is not valid anymore and cannot be resumed1. Upon
the reception of such an alert message, client C removes all
locally stored information related to session s. Conversely, in
case the flag Fs is set to TRUE, S continues to perform the
DTLS handshake. Once session s resumption has been com-
pleted, client C increments its own local resumption counter
RCs. Also, server S increments the resumption counter value
RCs in the cache entry Es of table TS .
1 Note that the time interval between two consecutive oc-
currences of KMS re-provisioning is supposed to be much
greater than the timeout considered by server S for removing
entries from table TS .
